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BOOK REVIEW
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PROPERTY

RIGHTS IN

by Mark L. Pollot. Pacific Research Institute for
Public Policy, San Francisco, California. 1993. Pp. 222.
Hardcover. $21.95

AMERICA,

Reviewed by Patrick Wiseman*
The meaning of the "Takings" Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution' has been the frequent subject of heated debate in recent years. The debate
needs a voice of moderation. Unfortunately, Mark Pollot is
not that voice. While there is much value to Pollot's discussion, his case is substantially weakened by his reliance on
originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation, and
by his related reliance on the precepts of "natural law." His
case is further weakened by his angry and defensive tone.
Pollot throws down the gauntlet in the frontispiece to his
book, in which he quotes an address he gave to the National
Federal Lands Conference in November 1990.2 In those remarks, he takes the position that:
[w]hen regulation is the method by which the taking is
achieved, it is no defense to a [sic] uncompensated taking
to say that the government has not taken much, or that
the owner of the property has some economically viable
use left in the property when the government finishes regulating it. The Constitution forbids petit larceny as much
as grand theft and it does not distinguish between the
taking of some property, and the taking of all property.3
©1994 by Patrick Wiseman.

* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law; B.A. (honors), 1971, University of Kent at Canterbury; Ph.D., 1980, University of Colorado; J.D., 1980, Columbia University.

1. "Private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST., AMEND. V. This clause, often referred to as the "Takings Clause," is also referred to as the "Just Compensation Clause."
2. MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY iii (1993).
3. Id.
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In essence, Pollot is rejecting the United States Supreme
Court's consistent understanding of the Takings Clause in
this century. Before 1922, when the Supreme Court decided
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,4 it had hardly been recognized that a regulation of land use short of physical invasion
could effect a taking; since Mahon, the Court has consistently
treated regulatory takings as different from physical takings.5 Pollot rejects the distinction, arguing that it has no basis in the original understanding of the Constitution.6
The issue in physical takings cases, as the U.S. Supreme
Court has approached them, is whether government has authorized an actual occupation of private property.7 If so, the
Court has held, there is a compensable taking, however minor the physical invasion and whatever public interest it may
serve. The issue in regulatory takings cases, by contrast, is
how best to balance the harm to an individual property owner
against the public benefit of a regulation of land use.' Pollot
would interpret the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause to
strike that balance presumptively in favor of the individual;
the Supreme Court has, until quite recently, interpreted the
Takings Clause to strike the balance more often in favor of
government.1 0
4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426 (1982).
[T]he Court has often upheld substantial regulation of an owner's use
of his own property where deemed necessary to promote the public interest. At the same time, we have long considered a physical intrusion
by government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious
character for purposes of the Takings Clause. Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a
permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred.
Id.
6. POLLOT, supra note 2, pp. 92-95.
7. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419.
8. See id. at 441.
9. See, e.g., Penn Central Transport. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) ("A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government... than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.").
10. Until recently, government has defeated most regulatory takings
claims. See id. (finding in Penn Central a valid landmark designation even
though its effect was to reduce significantly the value of the affected property).
Recently, the Court has seemed more receptive to regulatory takings claims.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (finding
that a regulation of land use, if it destroyed all viable use, effected a taking).
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This review focuses on two strategies that Pollot adopts
to strike the balance presumptively in favor of the individual.
They are discussed under the following heads: (1) original intent and natural law; (2) judicial deference to legislative judgment; and (3) conceptual severance and the denominator
problem. In each, Pollot relies on originalism and natural
law arguments.
(1)

ORIGINAL INTENT AND NATURAL LAw

Leonard W. Levy has argued that it was not the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution that their original intent
govern interpretation of the document.'1 He has also shown
that reliance on original intent, either that of the Framers or
that of the ratifiers, is impossible, because there is no reliable
way to determine that intent; even if there were, there is
every reason to expect that their intent would not be univocal. 12 Pollot dismisses Levy's argument in a footnote, and
proceeds to rely on original intent in his interpretation of the
Takings Clause. 13 He offers the following argument for relying on the "original meaning" of the Constitution:
The idea that the most fundamental law of a nation, intended to ensure against infringement on liberty, was created without a fixed reference point from which its meanings could be ascertained is flawed from its inception.
Such an idea is without any serious analogue in any other
debate over the meaning of written words. The claim that
the Constitution is an endlessly elastic document to be reinterpreted at will is a proposition calculated to free both
the electorate and an activist judiciary from the conwhat a written
straints of the Constitution-precisely
4
constitution is designed to prevent.1
11. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
(1988).
12. See id.
13. POLLOT, supra note 2, at 8. It is mildly ironic that Pollot is so dismissive
of Levy's argument, as there is some indication that Levy agrees substantively
with Pollot's interpretation of the Takings Clause. See LEVY, supra note 11, at

388.
14. POLLOT, supra note 2, at 10. There is, of course, at least one "other debate over the meaning of words" in which the idea that the intent of the authors

should be discounted is taken seriously, and that is the debate over the significance of legislative history to statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia has taken
the position that, where the language of a statute is plain, legislative history is
irrelevant. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza- Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J.,

concurring).

1092

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

This is a specious, if familiar, argument for originalism. Rejection of the notion that, in interpreting the Constitution,
courts should try to discern its "original meaning" is not to
take the view that the Constitution is "endlessly elastic"after all, the text of the Constitution is the "fixed reference
point," and it remains to be interpreted. Adding additional
texts (the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, etc.),
themselves in need of interpretation, does not obviously recommend itself as a way to make the primary text clearer.
Furthermore, originalists cannot themselves agree on the
"original meaning" of the Constitution. Pollot, for example,
argues that it "was clearly the view of the Framers and ratifiers [that] the Constitution... is a grant of limited authority to government in which people give up a small measure of
[pre-existing] rights to secure the protection of a greater measure." 15 Robert Bork, also an originalist, believes, according
to Pollot himself, that "the Constitution provides a positive
grant of liberty, revocable at any time, and individuals are
entitled to no more."' 6 Nonetheless, Pollot claims that the
original meaning of the Takings Clause can be ascertained
17
and so should be relied upon.
Pollot further argues that, in order to ascertain original
meaning, we should examine the precepts of "natural law," as
the Framers intended."8 Whether the Framers believed in
natural law, its "precepts" are not so easily established as
Pollot asserts. An example should suffice to show that Pollot's reliance on natural law begs the question and contributes nothing to the substantive analysis:
Natural law theory holds that an individual's rights in
property can be interfered with only if compensation is
provided except in the narrow circumstances in which the
individual's use of his or her property worked an affirmative harm to other property owners or in which certain
crimes were committed. 19
15.

POLLOT, supra note 2, at 11.

16. Id. Pollot cites Bork with apparent approval. See POLLOT, supra note 2,
at 10, n.12, wherein he defers to Bork's rebuttal of the arguments against
originalism (citing ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 183-85 (1989)).
Moments later, he disagrees with Bork's understanding of the original meaning
of the Constitution. See POLLOT, supra note 2, at 11.
17. POLLOT, supra note 2, at 11.

18. Id. at 34-37.
19. Id. at 102.

1994]

GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY

1093

Pollot cites no authority for this assertion of what natural law

"holds." One could, with equal authority, assert that natural
law theory holds that an individual's ownership of property is
as a trustee for the public, and so beg the question in the opposite direction.
(2)

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT

Pollot argues that the Framers were justifiably suspicious of legislatures, and so would expect courts not to defer
to legislative judgment when property rights were at stake.20
However, as Pollot notes, the U.S. Supreme Court has, until
recently, been extremely deferential to legislative judgment. 21 Although the Court applied a "substantial relationship" test (between the legislative purpose and the legislative
means to achieve it), the Court has consistently held in land
use regulation cases that, "[i]f the validity of the legislative
classification ...be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment

must be allowed to control."22 In a representative democracy,
it is surely appropriate for courts to defer to the political and
economic judgments of properly constituted legislatures conducting their business appropriately, within the substantive
limits of the Constitution. Pollot worries, however, that deference to legislative judgment allows governments to take
property at will.2 3 Pollot's worry arises because he confuses

two separate and distinct questions: (1) whether the government regulation violates due process; and (2) whether the
government regulation effects a taking. 24 Deference to legislative judgment is appropriate at the due process stage of the
inquiry, because due process only requires government to act
rationally; as the Court said in Euclid, if the question "be
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control."25 If a government regulation fails the rationality
test, it is a violation of due process, and the analysis ends.
There is no further takings analysis to be done, as the Tak20. Id. at 27-31, 52-63.
21. Id. at 63-66.
22. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
23. See, e.g., POLLOT, supra note 2, at 28.
24. The analysis in the remainder of this paragraph is presented in more
(and slightly different) detail in Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means:
UnderstandingTakings Jurisprudencein a Legal System with Integrity, 63 St.
John's L. Rev. 433 (1989).
25. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.

1094

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

ings Clause prohibits taking private property "for public use,
without just compensation, 2 6 and a regulation that serves no
public purpose ipso facto fails the public use test of the Takings Clause. But a rational government regulation may
nonetheless effect a taking, for which compensation must be
paid. Thus, an appropriate deference to legislative judgment
at the due process stage of the inquiry does not preclude finding a taking at the next stage.
(3)

CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE AND THE DENOMINATOR

As previously noted, Pollot rejects the distinction (on
which the Supreme Court has relied since Mahon) between
government-authorized physical invasion or occupancy of private property and regulation of private property that results
in a diminution in value.2" It is Pollot's view that any interference with private property rights that could be characterized as destruction of a property interest is a taking of that
interest. So, when New York City denied Penn Central the
opportunity to develop its air rights,2 8 it had thereby acquired an "easement" in Penn Central's property.2 9 Pollot
suggests that so treating the case avoids the vagueness inherent in the notion of "reasonable, investment-backed expectations," on which the Penn Central court relied.3 0 But, of
course, it does no such thing-any diminution in value
caused by regulation could be conceptually severed from the
remainder of the property and be characterized as an "easement" insofar as it interferes with an owner's use." Either
Pollot is suggesting that government must compensate land
owners for any and all diminutions in value caused by regulation of land use,3 2 or he must acknowledge the need to distinguish between those diminutions in value that amount to the
26.
27.

U.S.

Const., Amend. V (emphasis supplied).
supra note 2, at 93-95.

POLLOT,

28. See Penn Central Transport. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
29. POLLOT, supra note 2, at 126-28.
30. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
31. For a discussion of "conceptual severance," see Margaret Jane Radin,
The Liberal Conceptionof Property:Cross Currentsin the Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667 (1988).
32. He sometimes seems to go so far. See POLLOT, supra note 2, at 92 ("The

Holmesian view of property [which Pollot endorses and contrasts with the
Brandeis/Brennan view] requires compensation for any interest actually taken

from the property owner, without regard to the fact that some property interest
or value remains in the hands of the affected party.").
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"taking" of a property "interest" and those that do not. The
suspicion is that Pollot would endorse the first position-but
even Holmes acknowledged that government could not operate were it not able to regulate land use, and that only some
regulation goes "too far."3 3 When it comes to regulatory takings, Justice Brennan correctly noted that takings jurisprudence "does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments."3 4 It could not-for if it did, any government
regulation that caused a diminution in land value could be
treated as a taking. Once he has rejected the distinction between regulatory diminutions in value and physical occupations, Pollot is able to cite many historical documents to the
effect that a taking of "any part" of a person's property requires compensation.3 5 These documents, however, are irrelevant to the question that Pollot begs by citing them: whether
a diminution in value is properly characterized as a "part" of
is,
one's property. The Supreme Court has never held that3 it
it. 6
and only Justice Scalia has ever seriously suggested
Pollot's insistence that a diminution in value is
equivalent to the loss of a property "interest" (i.e., his reification of the slightest impairment of land use or value) blinds
him to the distinction between physical and regulatory takings.3 7 As a consequence, he misinterprets the Court's opin38
ion in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission. In Nollan,
33. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
34. POLLOT, supra note 2, at 93. This is the "denominator" problem: in deciding whether property has been taken, does a court focus on that "part" of the
property affected by regulation, or on the affected owner's whole property? In
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court arguably focused on the former. Pennsylvania
Coal (referring to "certain coal"); in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), the Court, in a case that reprised Pennsylvania Coal, made it quite clear that the focus should be on the owner's entire
holdings, and not on the coal that was required by regulation to remain in
place. See id. at 498 ("The 27 million tons of coal [required by the challenged
statute to remain in place] do not constitute a separate segment of property for
takings law purposes.").
35. See POLLOT, supra note 2, at 95-100.
36. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15-24 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), which Pollot never mentions.
37. Pollot pays lip service to the notion that "government can[ ] regulate
without causing a taking in every instance." Pollot, supra note 2, at 103. However, it is clearly his view that any diminution in value caused by government
regulation is a taking. Presumably, government can regulate without causing a
taking only if its regulation of land use is value-neutral or value-enhancing, an
absurd proposition on its face.
38. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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Pollot claims, the Supreme Court indicated that it was willing to accept his view that a taking may occur even when economically viable use remains in the land regulated;39 Nollan,
properly understood, stands for no such proposition. Nollan
was a physical invasion case, and a taking has always been
found in physical invasion cases, regardless of any diminution in value. 40 Pollot claims that the Court did not treat Nollan as a physical invasion case, ignoring the Court's citation
of Loretto to precisely this effect:
We think a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred,
for purposes of [the Loretto] rule, where individuals are
given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and
fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted
to station himself permanently upon the premises. 41
In Nollan, the Court concluded that if the California
Coastal Commission wanted an easement across the Nollans'
property, "it must pay for it." 42 The Court thus acknowledged

that the California Coastal Commission proposed to authorize a physical invasion of the Nollans' property, for which
compensation must be paid, however minor the invasion and
regardless of the public interest served. Nollan simply does
not support the view that a regulatory taking will be found
when the regulated property retains an economically viable
use.
CONCLUSION

Pollot's refusal to distinguish between physical and regulatory takings on the basis that the Framers of the Constitution recognized no such distinction undermines his entire
thesis. While it is undoubtedly true that the Framers valued
property rights highly, it is equally clear that they did not
anticipate the modern need to regulate land use. The notion
of a regulatory taking was novel in 1922 when Justice
Holmes suggested it in Pennsylvania Coal, and it was a sensible response to substantially changed circumstances. The
problem with Pollot's insistence that we give the Constitution
39. POLLOT, supra note 2, at 190.
40. See, in particular, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corpora-

tion, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
41. Id. at 832 (footnote omitted).
42. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42.
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the meaning its Framers and ratifiers intended is that the
intent of its Framers and ratifiers is thoroughly ambiguous
and is as much in need of interpretation as the meaning of
the Constitution itself. Given that modern land use regulation was unknown to the Framers and ratifiers, it is at least
as plausible to suggest that they had no intent when it came
to intrusive regulation of land use as it is to say that they
intended that any diminution in value caused by regulation
be treated as a taking. Thus, even if the historical evidence
supported Pollot's libertarian interpretation of the Framers'
views, the text of the Constitution would still require modern
interpretation in light of modern needs.
It is unfortunate that Pollot's case is so undermined by
his resting on the shaky foundation of originalism. As he
demonstrates in his first chapter, governments have been allowed to get away with abusive and destructive regulation of
land use. Pollot's anger at these cases is entirely justified.
Regrettably, he does not temper his anger in the interest of
rational analysis, and his book suffers as a result.

